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Abstract—Secret keys can be generated and shared between two wireless nodes by measuring and encoding radio channel 
characteristics without ever revealing the secret key to an eavesdropper at a third location. This paper addresses bit extraction, i.e., the 
extraction of secret key bits from noisy radio channel measurements at two nodes such that the two secret keys reliably agree. 
Problems include 1) nonsimultaneous directional measurements, 2) correlated bit streams, and 3) low bit rate of secret key generation. 
This paper introduces high-rate uncorrelated bit extraction (HRUBE), a framework for interpolating, transforming for decorrelation, and 
encoding channel measurements using a multibit adaptive quantization scheme which allows multiple bits per component. We present 
an analysis of the probability of bit disagreement in generated secret keys, and we use experimental data to demonstrate the HRUBE 
scheme and to quantify its experimental performance. As two examples, the implemented HRUBE system can achieve 22 bits per 
second at a bit disagreement rate of 2.2 percent, or 10 bits per second at a bit disagreement rate of 0.54 percent.
Index Terms—Wireless networks, multipath fading, physical layer, cryptography, key generation.
----------------------------------  ♦  ----------------------------------
1 Introduction
T h i s  paper investigates the generation of shared secret 
keys from the observation and processing of reciprocal 
radio channel properties. Shared secret keys are necessary for 
private communication over an open channel. Public key 
cryptography has been the most common method for the 
establishment of such keys, but concerns about its limitations 
has spawned interest in new methods for key sharing. For 
example, quantum cryptography [1], [2], [3] does not use 
public keys, but is prohibitively expensive for most applica­
tions. Shared secret key generation from radio channel 
measurements, on the contrary, is very inexpensive and can 
be done with any standard radio devices which can receive 
and transmit on the same frequency channel. We envision its 
application in mobile and portable radio communications 
systems, such as IEEE 802.11 or 802.15.4, which communicate 
on time-division duplex (TDD) channels.
Shared secret key generation from channel measure­
ments is an application which benefits from the randomness 
of the multipath channel. It would not, for example, work in 
a truly free-space environment (such as deep space radio 
links). Secret sharing benefits from:
• Reciprocity of the wireless radio channel: The 
multipath properties of the radio channel (gains,
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phase shifts, and delays) at any point in time and on 
any given frequency channel are identical on both 
directions of the link.
• Temporal variations in the radio channel: Over time, 
the multipath channel changes due to movement of 
either end of the link, and any motion of people and 
objects in the environment near the link. An 
application may specifically request a user to move 
or shake her wireless device in order to generate 
more temporal variation.
• Spatial variations: The properties of the radio 
channel are unique to the locations of the two 
endpoints of the link. An eavesdropper at a third 
location more than a few wavelengths from either 
endpoint will measure a different, uncorrelated 
radio channel [4].
Essentially, the radio channel is a time and space-varying 
filter, that at any point in time has the identical filter 
response for signals sent from a to b as for signals sent from 
b to a.
Although the radio channel is reciprocal, measurements of 
the radio channel are not reciprocal. Additive noise con­
tributes to each measurement as it does in any received 
signal. Also, the transceiver hardware used by the two nodes 
is not identical and affects the signal in each direction in a 
different way. Furthermore, measurements in both directions 
of the link cannot typically be made simultaneously.
Finally, interference power is asymmetric. The proposed 
system is susceptible to denial-of-service by jamming, in the 
same way that the wireless link is susceptible to jamming. If 
nodes cannot communicate, then they also cannot measure 
signal strength and share a secret key. However, if multiple- 
access interference is infrequent, and two nodes can receive 
many packets from each other, they will have many 
measurements of signal strength, marginally impacted by
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of high-rate uncorrelated bit extraction.
interference, with which to encode a secret key. This 
assum es that an acknow ledgem ent protocol is applied so 
that two nodes agree on which packets are to be used in the 
proposed system.
We refer to these sources of nonreciprocity collectively as 
"noise" because they are the ultim ate cause of bit disagree­
m ents between the secret keys generated at nodes o and b.
Bit extraction, i.e., the extraction of secret key bits from 
noisy radio channel m easurem ents at tw o nodes such that 
the two secret keys reliably agree, is a major statistical 
signal processing problem in shared secret key generation. 
As opposed to com m unications signal processing, it has no 
interest in obtaining the transm itted data from another 
device. We refer to this problem as a radio channel signal 
processing problem since m easurem ents of the radio channel 
are the signal of interest. This paper contributes a statistical 
fram ework and algorithm  for bit extraction which extracts a 
high bit rate w ith given reliability and ensures a bit vector 
with nearly zero correlation. This fram ew ork is a significant 
im provem ent on the state of the art in the research area.
Recent results have both suggested and dem onstrated bit 
extraction from a variety  of d ifferen t rad io  channel 
m easurem ent modalities (e.g., time delay, am plitude, phase, 
and angle). These results are reviewed in Section 2. Several 
w orks limit the num ber of bits per m easurem ent to one or 
zero. Several w orks have decreased the m easurem ent rate 
because correlation between m easurem ents leads to correla­
tion between bits in the secret key, which is detrim ental to 
the security of data encoded w ith that key. Both com pro­
mises reduce the bit rate of generated secret keys. In 
addition, solutions are ad hoc; each m easurem ent modality 
requires a separate methodology for secret key generation.
This w ork provides a fram ew ork for bit extraction using 
three signal processing methods:
1. Fractional interpolation: Introduces different frac­
tional delays at each node to account for the fact 
that the two directional m easurem ents are not 
measured sim ultaneously.
2. Decorrelation transformation: Produces a m easure­
ment vector with uncorrelated com ponents via a 
K arhunen-Loeve transform ation of the original 
channel m easurem ent vector.
3. M ultibitadaptive quantization (MAQ): Converts real­
valued channel m easurem ents into bits adaptively 
based on the m easured value, using communication 
so that both nodes agree on the quantization scheme.
The flow chart of the proposed method is shown in Fig. 1. In 
this paper, we use these procedures in order to transform 
correlated, real-valued radio channel signal m easurem ents 
at tw o nodes into uncorrelated binary data which has a high
probability of bit agreement. We refer to the combination of 
the m ethods as high-rate uncorrelated bit extraction (HRUBE).
As discussed in Section 2, there are m ethods, called 
information reconciliation m ethods, to resolve bit disagree­
m ents between tw o nodes w ithout giving away the entire 
secret key. These m ethods do give away some information 
to an eavesdropper; if enough information can be obtained, 
an eavesdropper could perform a brute-force search to find 
the secret key. It is best to minimize the num ber of bit 
disagreem ents and to know  a priori the probability of bit 
disagreem ent so that an information reconciliation method 
can be designed efficiently. This paper provides a theore­
tical fram ework to design system s with low probability of 
bit disagreement.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we 
discuss the w ork in the area of secret key extraction from 
radio channel m easurem ents, and position this w ork in that 
frame. In Section 3, we provide an adversary model. In 
Section 4, we describe the fractional interpolation method 
used to correct for nonsim ultaneous radio channel m easure­
ments. Section 5 presents the decorrelation of the measured 
radio channel signal, and Section 6 presents the m ultibit 
adaptive quantization m ethod. Sections 4-6 provide the 
methodology and analysis of high-rate uncorrelated bit 
extraction. In Section 7, the HRUBE method is implemented 
in wireless nodes and the bit disagreem ent rate is shown 
and com pared to the analytical results. Finally, future w ork 
and conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2 Related  W ork
There have been several papers on the topic of secret key 
generation from radio channel m easurem ents. In the earliest 
w ork [5], it w as suggested to send two unm odulated 
continuous wave (CW) signals in both directions through a 
channel and m easure and quantize the phase difference 
between the tw o at each end of the link to generate a shared 
secret. Phase differences between m ultiple channels have 
been further explored in [6], [7].
Time delay and gain are also features of the radio channel 
that are reciprocal and can be used for secret generation. The 
im pulse response, in particular, the am plitude of m ultipath 
at many time delays, can be used as a shared secret [8], [9], 
[10]. While M adiseh et al. [8] and Wilson et al. [10] use 
u ltraw ideband (UWB) radios to m easure the im pulse 
response, Ye et al. [9] estimate channel gains and delays 
from relatively narrow band cellular signals.
A m p litu d e  or channel gain is the m ost com m on 
reciprocal channel feature used for secret generation in 
literature [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17]. A m plitude can 
be more easily measured than time delay or phase on most 
existing hardw are, and thus is more readily applicable to 
common wireless networks.
Angle-of-arrival (AOA) itself is not reciprocal—the AOA 
at the tw o ends of a link is different. However, steerable 
directional antennas can be used as in [14] to measure 
reciprocal channel gains, which are reciprocal, and generate 
shared secret keys. The antenna used in [14] is a relatively 
simple directional antenna, bu t requires access points to 
have additional physical space for a m ultielem ent antenna.
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In Section 7, we use measurements of amplitude for its 
ease of implementation. However, the HRUBE methods are 
generally applicable across channel measurement modal­
ities discussed above.
A critical part of practical systems will be the ability to 
generate arbitrarily long secret keys. Research has ad­
dressed the use of multiple measurements to increase the 
size of the secret. As mentioned, Aono et al. [14] used 
multiple different beam patterns to allow for multiple 
measurements. Multiple measurements can also be made at 
many different frequencies [12]. Multiple measurements 
over time are used in [11], [13], [15], [6], [16], [17] to increase 
the number of bits in the secret. In this work, we provide a 
method to decorrelate an arbitrary vector of collected 
measurements. Previous works have often used correlated 
measurements to generate the secret key, which may be less 
robust to attacks.
Significant research has addressed the more general 
topic of obtaining a shared secret key from observations of 
correlated random variables [18], [19]. An eavesdropper can 
also observe a correlated random variable, and the secrecy 
information rate is shown to be a function of the mutual 
information between these three observed random vari­
ables. Analysis of the secrecy rate for UWB channels in [8], 
[10] and for fading channels in [13] have applied this 
analysis to the case in which the correlated random 
variables correspond to measured radio channel character­
istics. Information-theoretic results have shown that two 
nodes cannot achieve an arbitrarily small bit disagreement 
rate without communicating some information over a 
common channel [18].
Because of these results, most reported research has used 
limited feedback [11], [9], [10], [13], [14], [6], [17] to correct 
small amounts of disagreement between the secret gener­
ated at the two ends of a link. This communication is 
referred to as “information reconciliation," "public feed­
back," or "error correction." In this paper, we assume that 
information reconciliation will be part of the system design, 
but we do not explore its use. We explore minimizing the 
rate of bit disagreement in order to reduce the quantity of 
information reconciliation that must be performed in order 
to reliably agree on a shared secret key.
As an alternative to information reconciliation, Sayeed 
and Perrig [7] suggest that when bit disagreements are seen 
in a secret key, nodes should simply regenerate a new secret 
until the secret key agrees. The work in [7] explores the 
energy trade-off between secret regeneration and transmit 
power (to increase the SINR at the ends of the link to reduce 
the probability of bit disagreement).
The majority of reported research has addressed system 
development from simulation and analysis using standard 
statistical channel models [8], [7], [11], [9], [10], [13], [15], [6], 
Statistical channel fading models such as Rayleigh, Ricean, 
and Gaussian have been applied. These models can be used 
to compute the probabilities of secret key bit agreement, the 
probabilities that retransmission is necessary, and the bit 
rate which can be generated either in theory or by a 
particular encoding algorithm.
Notably, several researchers have reported experimental 
results and implementations [10], [12], [14], [16]. In [10],
several bidirectional UWB measurements are made and 
used to compute the number of secret key bits which could 
be generated. In [12], an implementation using the universal 
software radio peripheral (USRP) and GNU software radio 
generates and receives the required multicarrier signal and 
evaluates the bit rate of the system. Two implementations in
[16] use both off-the-shelf and testbed 802.11a devices to 
implement secret sharing and achieve about a 1 bit per 
second rate. In [14], researchers use a steerable directional 
antenna in combination with Zigbee radio hardware to 
generate a secret between two nodes and test what an 
eavesdropper would have received. This work also demon­
strates its techniques using a Zigbee radio implementation, 
but the techniques reported here are fundamentally unlike 
those reported in [14]. This paper reports in detail a new 
method for reliably estimating a high-rate uncorrelated bit 
stream from radio channel measurements.
We have not seen any secret key bit rate reported as high 
as achieved in our experiments, up to 22 bits/sec. In [16], an 
experimental implementation achieves about a 1 bit/sec rate, 
for which the authors target a 1CT8 bit disagreement rate. In 
this paper, we report experimental bit rates from 3 bits/sec at 
the lowest probability of bit disagreement (0.04 percent) to a 
rate of 22 bits/sec at the highest probability of bit disagree­
ment (2.2 percent). There is a trade-off in secret key 
generation between high bit rate of the secret key and low 
probability of bit disagreement, and the proposed method 
can be used to provide a variety of achievable points, 
particularly at higher bit rates than previously reported.
3 A dversary M odel
In our adversary model, we assume that the adversary, Eve, 
can listen to all the communication between Alice and Bob. 
Eve can also measure both the channels between herself and 
Alice and between herself and Bob at the same time when 
Alice and Bob measure the channel between them for key 
extraction. We also assume that Eve knows the key 
extraction algorithm and the values of the parameters used 
in the algorithm. However, we assume that Eve cannot be 
very close (less than a few multiples of the wavelength of the 
radio waves being used [16]) to either Alice or Bob while 
they are extracting their shared key. This will ensure that 
Eve measures a different, uncorrelated radio channel [4], We 
assume that Eve cannot jam the communication channel 
between Alice and Bob. We also assume that Eve cannot 
cause a man-in-the-middle attack, i.e., our methodology 
does not authenticate Alice or Bob. In other words, the 
proposed system works against passive adversaries. In this 
aspect, the technique of key extraction from wireless signal 
strengths is comparable with classical key establishment 
techniques such as Diffie-Hellman, which also use message 
exchanges to establish keys and do not authenticate Alice or 
Bob. However, classical key exchange techniques make use 
of unproven assumptions about the computational hardness 
of different problems such as the discrete logarithm 
problem. In contrast, the proposed key extraction technique 
provides information-theoretic secrecy and does not assume 
any bound on the computational power of the adversary.
Even without an authentication mechanism, the Diffie- 
Hellman scheme has found widespread use in network
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security protocols and standards (e.g., for providing Perfect 
Forward Secrecy, Strong password protocols, etc.). We expect 
that our scheme will provide a strong alternative to the Diffie- 
Hellman scheme in wireless networks. There is a growing 
amount of work in authenticating wireless devices based on 
their physical and radiometric properties (e.g., [17], [20]). 
These and future authentication mechanisms can be used in 
conjunction with our secret key establishment scheme.
4 Fractional Interpolation  Filtering
Channel measurements for secret key generation will almost 
certainly be half duplex, that is, the transmission from node 
a to node b is not made at the same time as the transmission 
from node b to node a. Standard transceivers cannot 
transmit and receive simultaneously, so nonsimultaneous 
measurements in the two directions must be dealt with 
regardless of the type of radio channel measurements made. 
As described in Section 2, many methods use sequential 
measurements over time in order to generate arbitrarily long 
secret keys. In this paper, we use fractional interpolation 
filters to allow nodes to estimate what the measurements 
would have been if they had been measured simultaneously.
For channel measurement, we assume that nodes 
repeatedly transmit packets in a TDD protocol.1 Each node 
receives a packet from the other node and uses it to measure 
the channel characteristic. Let wa(i) be the tth channel 
measurement at node a made at time Ta(i). We assume that 
the constant packet rate means the ith measurement is 
made at time ra(i) =  ra(i — 1 ) +  Ta,a where Tr is the time 
since the previous measurement. Similarly, node b makes 
ith measurement wb(i) at time u ii)  =  ni'i — 1 ) +  Tup.
We assume that channel measurements are made at 
greater than the Nyquist rate for the channel. For a fading 
channel, the Nyquist rate is twice the maximum Doppler 
frequency, fa. Previous works have assumed that channel 
probes in the two directions are much more frequent than fa 
[16]. In this work, probing requirements are relaxed 
somewhat because the signal can be reconstructed at 
simultaneous probe times as long as the probes are taken 
more often than i.e., we always have TatC <  ^  for 
c e  {a, 6}.
In general, given that samples are taken at least as fast as 
the Nyquist rate, interpolation can be performed regardless 
of whether Thj{! and Tap are constant over time, or if 
Ta,a /  Tup. Thus, multiple-access delays, or delays due to 
retransmission, are acceptable within a limit. As a simple 
example, one might perform linear interpolation between 
samples to approximate the value of w a at time r  with 
Ta(i -  1) < T < Ta(i) as
wa(i -  1 ) +  [r -  ra(i -  1 )]- 1 )
1 ) (1 )
explicit synchronization is required in this procedure. Other 
approximation algorithms can use ra and wa from multiple 
recent samples to perform higher order interpolation.
Here, for computational simplicity, we choose to imple­
ment a protocol which allows nodes a nearly constant 
packet rate. Thus, we assume Tr =  Ta,a =  Tup for all time. 
We define two fractional interpolation filters, one for each 
node. We define the fractional sampling offset /i as
Tr
(2)
Without loss of generality, assume that ra(i) < n (i) , so that 
H >  0. If node a delayed its ith sample by (1 and
simultaneously, node b delayed its samples by (1 — n)Ta, 
we would have had simultaneous measurements. To 
estimate these delayed samples, we specify a fractional 
delay jic and integer delay mc for each node:
/As = H, IM, =  1 -  H,
ma =  1 , =  0.
After using a fractional interpolation filter to delay its signal 
by Ha =  node a will also add an additional unit sample 
delay. Node b uses its fractional interpolation filter to delay 
its signal by nb =  1 — /i, and does not add any additional 
unit delays.
We use the Farrow filter, a finite-impulse response 
implementation which introduces an arbitrary fractional 
delay [21]. Standard implementations of the Farrow filter 
are four-tap FIR filters which provide a parabolic or cubic 
interpolation between samples. Such filters are often used 
in discrete-time implementations of receiver timing syn­
chronization loops, and are well suited for DSP implemen­
tation [22], We implemented a cubic Farrow filter, 









Note that hc requires recalculation only when /ic changes. 
The input of filter hc are the measurements {wc(i)}!;/ and we 
define the output as {xc(i)}!;. These outputs are estimates of 
the radio channel at simultaneous instants, halfway 
between the original nonsimultaneous measurements. 
These vectors x a and x b,
x a =  [xa( l f , ... ,x a(Ar) , , 
x6 =  [x6(l)T, ... ,x 6(Ar)T]T,
where N  is the desired length of the vector. These vectors 
become the input for the decorrelation transformation 
discussed in the following section.
5 Decorrelation  T ransformation
In this paper, we use the discrete Karhunen-Loeve trans­
form (KLT) to convert the measured channel vectors x a and 
Xft into uncorrelated components. The KLT has been applied 
for many different types of signals for purposes of noise
If nodes agreed to interpolate to halfway between their 
probing times, then both nodes would u ser =  I [Ta(i) +  Tf,(i)} 
in (1). Since each node would be able to record transmission 
or reception times, ra(i) and Tf,(i) for all i, on its own clock, no
1. W hether or not the transm ission is a da ta  packet or any arbitrary 
finite-duration signal, w e use the term  “packet" to describe the 
transm ission.
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reduction and data compression. We apply the KLT for the 
purpose of generating nearly uncorrelated elements for our 
secret, which for robustness to attacks, should not contain 
significant correlation between elements.
The discrete KLT provides an orthogonal basis which 
decorrelates the input vector, assuming a known model for 
the covariance structure of the original vector. For parti­
cular classes of signals, we can find such statistical models; 
e.g., for electrocardiogram signals [23], voice signals, 
internet traffic measurements [24], and fingerprints [25], 
models have been developed from large sets of measure­
ments. In this paper, we develop such a covariance model 
using a large set of measurements, and use it to calculate the 
appropriate KLT.
In the discrete KLT, a linear transformation of an input 
vector is taken, which results in a vector with uncorrelated 
elements. Assume that the (length N) input vector at node 
c €  {a, 6},xr, has mean pc and covariance matrix J?x .2 A 
linear transform of the data is
yr =  A r (xc -  nc),
where A is an N  x N  matrix. The mean of yr is zero, and the 
covariance matrix of yr, Iiy, is given by
Ry =  E [y cy Z ] = A TR][A. (4)
Assume the singular value decomposition of i?x is
i?x =  USU1, (5)
where U is the matrix of eigenvectors, and S  = 
diag{<7j,. . . ,  <r|r}, a diagonal matrix of the corresponding 
eigenvalues. We assume that the eigenvectors have 
been sorted in order of decreasing eigenvalue, so that 
of > of > • • • > o% > 0. Note that UTU =  Im, where I,v is the 
N  x N  identity matrix.
The discrete Karhunen-Loeve transform simply assigns 
A =  U,
yr =  Ur (xc -  pc). (6)
The vectors yQ and y6 for nodes a and b, respectively, 
become the input for the MAQ scheme described in 
Section 6 . When simplifying (4) we have the result that
Ry =  Ut R J J  =  UTUSUTU =  S,
and the output vector yr, in fact, has a diagonal covariance 
matrix, indicating uncorrelated elements.
Note that uncorrelated is not the same as independent; 
while they are the same for Gaussian random vectors, they 
are not equivalent in general. The KLT guarantees zero 
covariance between elements, but not higher order cross­
moments. Uncorrelated but not independent bits may result 
in a per bit entropy of less than 1.0; we show in Section 7.7 
from experiments an entropy estimate of between 0.96 to
0.98. Depending on the true joint distribution, it may be 
possible for an attacker to use the higher order cross­
moments to predict one value from others. Investigation of
2. We assum e that the m ean a t each node can be different d u e  to the 
different transm it pow ers, bu t tha t the covariance m atrix  is the sam e a t both 
nodes.
this possibility must involve extensive measurements to 
allow inference on the joint distribution of the data yr, and 
we leave this to future research.
5.1 Bidirectional Measurement Oovariance
Although the elements of yr are decorrelated by the KLT, 
there is still covariance between the yr and y(-, where c, 
c € {a, b}, and c c. That is, c and c are the indices for the 
opposite direction measurements of the link between nodes 
a and b. In fact, a high positive correlation between the two 
different directions of the link is what enables secret 
sharing. We denote the covariance matrix of the original 
measurements to be -Rx,.,xP,
-Rx,„xe =  E[(xc -  IJ,c)(Xc -  /if)r ] =  E[(x<. -  IJ,c)(xc -  /ir)r ].
After the KLT, the vectors yr and y(- have covariance matrix 
denoted as Ry(.,yf,
Ryciys^ E \ y ^ } = U TR ^ U .  (7)
The ith diagonal element of Ryelyf, denoted here as 
is the covariance of yc(i) and yc(i). The variance of yr is given 
by of and is equal to the variance of yF since c, c € {a, 6}. So 
the correlation coefficient of the ith component, denoted pir is
The correlation coefficient p,; is effectively a measure of the 
SNR of the measurement of the bidirectional ith component 
of y. When the "noise" contributing to both ya(i) and yb(i) is 
high, the value of ,■ is low compared to of, and pt is
closer to zero. When there is very little noise, pt is close to 1. In 
Section 6.4, we show that the value of p,; is the critical 
component to determine both how many bits to which the ith 
component can be quantized, and the performance of the 
quantization method, i.e., the probability that the bits 
generated agree at the two nodes.
6 M ultibit  A daptive Q uantization
The objective of this section is to describe the quantization 
of the transformed vector yr, for c € {a, b}, into a secret key 
bit vector. Quantization in this application has two 
conflicting goals:
1. Secret length maximization: Obtain as long of a secret 
(in bits) as possible.
2. Error minimization: Keep the probability that the 
secret key will not match at nodes a and b as low 
as possible.
We also must maintain zero covariance between elements of 
secret key, and thus do not use vector quantization. Instead, 
we use scalar quantization on each element of yr. Consider 
this trade-off on a single component, component i. The 
quantizer for component i is a function <5,; : IR. —> 
{1 , . . . ,  2mi}, where m,; is the number of bits to which we 
quantize the ith component.
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6.1 Related Work: Censoring Scheme
Several past w orks in bit extraction from  channel m easure­
m ents have quantized each m easurem ent to one of tw o bins 
and a "censor" region [16], [17], [14], [15]. In these m ethods, 
w hen a m easurem ent has a value near zero, the m easure­
m ent is no t used  in  the secret, an d  otherw ise, the 
m easurem ent is quantized by its sign to a "0" or "1." This 
one bit and censor m ethod, as a standard  m ethod used in 
related work, provides a good point of com parison for the 
MAQ m ethod presented in this paper.
In the standard  censoring m ethod, a low threshold and a 
high threshold are specified, for example, [—7 , 7]- The 
indices of the values that fall w ithin the threshold region are 
not encoded. Specifically, node a forms the set T« =  {i : 
—7 < x a[i) <  7} and transm its the list of the elements in T„ 
to node b. N ode b then sim ilarly forms T /, and transm its 
T 1, \  T« to node a. The union of both sets, T  =  T« U T j ,  are 
the indices no t used  in the shared  secret. Let T  =  
{ 1 ,. . . ,  Ar} \  T  be the indices that will be used in the secret, 
and let tj 6 { 1 ,. . . ,  Ay} be the j th  elem ent of T , w here 
Ay =  |T |. Then, the secret key bit vector of node c G {a, b} is 
given by z c =  [“,.(1 ) ,..., ^.(Ay)]1, where
We note that the w ork in [16] does not directly encode 
x c(i). Instead, only one sam ple from  each "excursion" of 
{.r,.(?’)},; is encoded. A n excursion is any sequence of j ./•..(/ 
w hich are either all above the high threshold or below the low 
threshold. This m ethod allows h igh reliability in bit encoding 
while reducing correlation betw een subsequent bits.
The benefit of the one bit and censor scheme in general is 
that data that fall near zero, w hich w ould be likely to have 
opposite sign at the opposite end of the link, are not used in 
the secret. The value of yu(i) w ould be know n to an 
eavesdropper to be either w ithin or outside of the threshold 
region, bu t this provides no inform ation about w hether the 
value is above 7 or below —7 . If i e  T ,  the m easurem ent is 
not used in the secret, and if i ^  T ,  the eavesdropper has no 
inform ation about w hether yu{tj) is greater than 7 or less 
than —7 . So, the com m unicated data do not reveal anything 
about the generated secret key bits.
Com pared to the m ethod proposed in this paper, the 
censoring scheme has tw o m ain drawbacks. First, the use 
of censoring causes loss of bits. The num ber of bits lost to 
censoring depends on the m easured data. In order to 
ensure a secret w ith  a consistent num ber of bits, extra 
m easurem ents m ust be gathered prior to bit extraction. In 
num erical results related in Section 7.6, betw een 5 percent 
and 27 percent of the m easurem ents are lost to censoring. 
The second drawback is that it is not possible to generate 
m ore than one bit from  each real-valued m easurem ent, 
that is, m.j =  1 for all i.
6.2 Formulation
We propose a MAQ scheme for secret sharing. The MAQ 
schem e adaptively quantizes each m easurem ent to an 
arbitrary  num ber of bits w ithou t censoring. No fixed 
quantization scheme is able to achieve a low error rate 
because w hen yu(i) is very near to a threshold, there is a
TABLE 1
Example m, =  1-Bit Adaptive Quantization Scheme
Bin Codeword e Interval
k d\ do of y(i)
1 0 0 0 (-oo,F,-‘ (0.125)]
2 0 0 1 ( F ~*(0.125), F f 1 (0.25)]
3 0 1 1 ( F ~ l (0.25), F”1 (0.375)]
4 0 1 0 (f;-1 (0.375),F -1 (0.5)]
5 1 1 0 (F,~ * (0-5), F~  (0.625)]
6 1 1 1 (F,~l (0.625), F ~ 1 (0.75)]
7 1 0 1 (F -‘(0.75), F f1 (0.875)]
8 1 0 0 ( F f 1 (0.875), +oc)
high probability that yi,(i) crosses to the other side of that 
threshold . As a solution, w e propose to change the 
quan tiza tion  schem e at b o th  a and  b based  on the 
m easurem ent at one of the nodes. For this discussion, 
w ithout loss of generality, we assum e that node a is the 
"leader" node in the m ultibit adaptive quantization scheme, 
and  that node b is the "follower."
In the MAQ scheme, we first quantize yu(i) to K  =  
2m,+2 _  4 x 2"'i equally  likely quantization  levels. To 
achieve equally likely quantization levels, we require the 
distribution for yu(i). In general, let F;(y) =  P[yu{i) <  y\ be 
the cum ulative d istribu tion  function (CDF) of yu(i). 
Thresholds for equally  likely quan tiza tion  bins are 
generated by using the inverse of the CDF,
m  =  FT1 ■ for k =  1 .......ft’ -  1 . (10)
In the following, for ease of notation, let r/u =  — oc and 
t)k =  oc. The k th  quantization bin is the interval (%_i,%] 
for A- =  1 , ,  ft', so k(i) is given by
k(i) =  max { k  s.t. yu(i) >  1}. (11)
Next, we use a particular type of Gray code to adaptively 
assign a binary code w ord to each quantization bin. We do 
this by defining the following binary variables:
•  Define e(k), for k  =  1 , . . . ,  K  as
1, k  m od 4 >  2,
0, o.w.
In other w ords, e(k) is the 2s bit in the binary 
representation of integer k.
•  Create a Gray code w ord w ith  m,; bits, that is, an 
ordered list of 2'"' possible m ,-bit code w ords. A 
Gray code w ord list changes only one bit betw een 
neighboring code w ords in the list.
•  Let ,/i (k) =  [^p-j. Define <i| (k) s  {0,1}'"' to be equal 
to the ,/i (k )th  Gray code w ord. That is, it is the same 
Gray code w ord list bu t w ith each elem ent repeated 
four times.
•  Let M k )  =  [MljEudJij. Define d ^ k )  e  {0,1}'"' to be 
equal to the / u(A-)th Gray code. That is, it is the same 
list as d\ (k) bu t circularly shifted by two.
Two examples are presented in Tables 1 and 2, for the case 
of m.; =  1 and m,; =  2, respectively.
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TABLE 2
Example m, =  2-Bit Adaptive Quantization Scheme
Bin Codeword e Interval
k d\ do of y(i)
1 01 00 0 (—oo, F f 1 (0.0625)]
2 01 00 1 (fV-1 (0.0625), F f 1 (0.125)]
3 01 01 1 ( F f 1 (0.125), F f 1 (0.1875)]
4 01 01 0 ( F f  ‘ (0.1875), F f 1 (0.25)] 
(f7 >  (0.25), J 7 f (0.3125)]5 11 01 0
6 11 01 1 ( F f 1 (0.3125), F f 1 (0.375)]
7 11 11 1 ( F f 1 (0.375), F f 1 (0.4375)]
8 11 11 0 ( F f 1 (0.4375), F f 1 (0.5)]
9 10 11 0 ( F - , (0.5),F1- 1(0.5625)]
10 10 11 1 ( F f 1 (0.5625), F f 1 (0.625)]
11 10 10 1 ( F f 1 (0.625), F f 1 (0.6875)]
12 10 10 0 ( F f 1 (0.6875), F f 1 (0.75)] 
( F f :'(0.75), F f { (0.8125)]13 00 10 0
14 00 10 1 ( F f '  (0.8125), F f 1 (0.875)]
15 00 00 1 ( F f 1 (0.875), F f 1 (0.9325)
16 00 00 0 (F,-1 (0.9325), +oo)
M ultibit adaptive quantization proceeds as follows: First, 
from the values of ya(i), leader node a determ ines the 
quantization bin k(i)  for all com ponents i. Node a transm its
the bit vector e= [e(A :(l))....... e ik (N ))]1 to the follower
node b. Both nodes then encode their secret key using code 
w ord di w henever e =  1, and code w ord d{] w henever e =  0. 
Specifically, the secret key is
z =  [dl(k(1)){k { l)) ....... d ,{MN)){k{N ))},
w here k(i) is given in  (11).
6.3 Discussion
The above MAQ scheme provides a new  m ethod for a 
m ultibit adaptive quantization for each com ponent of 
vector y. No com ponents are "censored," and instead, a 
leader node decides upon  the quantization scheme from 
tw o options which is least likely to cause disagreem ent 
betw een the tw o nodes. W hen disagreem ents occur, due to 
the use of Gray coding, it is very likely that only one bit of 
the m ultibit code w ord will be in error.
Further, the passing of the vector e does not provide an 
eavesdropper with any inform ation about the secret key 
bits. K now ing e(k(i)) elim inates half of the possible 
quantization levels. But code w ords are equally likely given 
the knowledge of e(k(i)). For example, for the m ; =  1 case, if 
e =  1, then the eavesdropper knows that ya(i) is neither 
very high in  m agnitude nor very low in m agnitude. 
However, there are four possible equally likely bins with 
e =  1, tw o of which w ould be encoded w ith d\ =  1 and two 
with d\ =  0. The eavesdropper has no inform ation to which 
b it the com ponent w ill be encoded.
6.4 Analysis of Probability of Bit Disagreement
The perform ance of a particular MAQ scheme is m easured 
by its probability of bit disagreem ent (Pun), that is, the 
probability that nodes a and b encode a bit differently. We 
use the term "disagreem ent" rather than "error" because 
there is no notion of the "correct" bit to which a and  b 
should have encoded w hen they disagree.
0 + I I I I 
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1 
Node a Data Quantile, F'(/J
Fig. 2. Diagram showing area of F. 1{ya), l{yh) where generated bits 
at a and b will agree (gray area) and disagree (white area) for the 1-bit 
adaptive quantization scheme.
In this section, we analyze bit disagreem ent probabilities 
as a function of the num ber of quantization bits m ; and the 
joint distribution of y,t(i) and  yb(i)- Let the joint probability 
distribution function (pdf) be Db)- As discussed,
the tw o m arginal distributions are identical, so we refer to the 
m arginal p d f as j)(y )  and the CDF as Fj(y). The conditional 
CDF of yb(i) given y,t(i) is w ritten as Ix a w y in iV b M -
We first discuss the probability of code w ord disagree­
ment, and then provide an approxim ation for the prob­
ability of bit disagreem ent. The tw o are the same in  the 
riij =  1 case, bu t different in general.
For certain combinations of (y„(i)< yi,(i)), the code w ord at 
node a w ill be encoded differently than  at node b, and  these 
combinations can be viewed graphically on a 2D plot. Recall 
that node a is the leader node, and so ya decides the 
quantization scheme. Given y„(i), the value of yt,(i) thus 
decides w hether or not a bit disagreem ent occurs. For 
example, for the 1-bit adaptive quantization scheme dis­
played in Table 1, the combinations of (y,t( i) . Ub(i)) which 
result in b it agreem ent are show n in Fig. 2 as the gray shaded 
area. There is a w ide diagonal area, w here ya(i) is close to or 
equal to yb(i), which w ould result in code w ord agreement.
If w e refer to the shaded area of the diagram  (the bit 
agreem ent area) as A, then the probability of code w ord 
agreem ent, denoted P c a ,  is
Pc a  =  j  j  fy„ (im (i\(v< i-vb)dyad y b.
A nother way to w rite this equation is
P c a =  I  P[CA\ya]fi(ya)dva, (12 )
where P[C'A|i/„] is the probability of code agreem ent 
given y,t/
P[CA\ya] =  / fy,(i)\yji)(yb\ya)dyb,
J y beA(ya)
and  A (ya) =  {yb : G .4}.
6.5 MAQ Performance in Gaussian Case
For the case that ya(i) and yt,(i) are jointly Gaussian and 
zero mean, we can find a more direct expression for the
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P[CA\ya} >  <f>
PI
-<t> ^ ( A / J  _  PiVu
7‘V 1 ~ pi
(13)
’ 0.25, F.ljja) < 0.125.
0.5, 0.125 < Fi(ya) < 0.375,
0.75, 0.375 < Ft(ya) < 0.625,
. 1, 0.625 < FAjj,) .
' 0, FAjja) < 0.375.
0.25, 0.375 < Ft(ya) < 0.625,
0.5, 0.625 < Ft(ya) < 0.875,
. 0.75, 0.875 < F.tjja)-
In general, for an  m r bit quantization scheme,
n ;/u =  niin{l, \F t (ya) +  
j \  =  max{0, [Ft(ya) -
(14)
(15)
Fig. 3. Analytical approximation for the probability of bit disagreement 
from (17) as a function of number of bits per code word, m, and 
correlation coefficient, p.
probability of code agreement. Note that we know  that the 
marginal variances of y j i )  and yb(i) are identical, w hich we 
denote as of. Let the correlation coefficient of ya(i) and  yt,(i) 
be Then the conditional pd f of yi(i)\y 'a(i) has m ean 
PiYaH) and  variance a j ( l  — p j). Thus, P[CA|j/u] for the 1-bit 
adaptive quantization case can be w ritten as
Fig. 4. Diagram showing area of (yu, y(l) where generated bits at« and 6 
will agree (gray area), disagree (white area), and will be censored 
(crosshatched area) for the censoring scheme.
and bottom -right area in Fig. 2. These nondiagonal elements 
will typically have a very small probability, because they 
correspond to observing nearly opposite values on the tw o 
directional m easurem ents. Since the tw o m easurem ents have 
h igh positive correlation, it is highly unlikely to observe 
nearly opposite values.
Using (12) and  (13), we can solve for a lower bound on 
the probability of agreement. We note that for the Gaussian 
case, F f 1(x) = rrA> (.;•) w here ■!' (./•) is the inverse of the
zero-m ean unit-variance CDF. A substitution of v : 
results in the expression,
w here 4>(;r) is the unit-variance G aussian CDF, and  n,/u and 
fj,la are the high and  low limits for a given y„ of the segment 
of yb w hich results in code w ord agreement. For the 1-bit 
adaptive quantization case, it can be seen from Fig. 2 that
P c. t > <f>





Note that (16) is not a function of a u the variance of the 
ith com ponent of y. Instead, it is solely a function of <f>t and  m t. 
Note that the probability  of code disagreem ent P en =
1 — Pc a , from the lower bound in (16), we have an  upper 
bound on Pc p . Borrowing from digital comm unications 
analysis of Gray coded symbol constellations, for low P en , we 
can approxim ate the probability of bit disagreem ent, Pnn, as
(17)
w here we define the (/-multiple floor and  ceiling functions 
w hich return  the highest m ultiple of u lower than its 
argum ent, and  the lowest m ultiple of u higher than its 
argum ent, respectively
Equation (13) is less than or equal to the exact P[agreement ] 
because w e only consider the m ain d iagonal area of 
agreement. For example, we do not consider the top-left area
This expression (16) is solved numerically, and  results for 
the Pnn  are plotted in Fig. 3.
6.6 Censoring Scheme Performance 
in Gaussian Case
The m ultibit adaptive quantization  scheme offers the 
possibility of encoding a com ponent w ith more than one 
bit, w hich is not possible in the existing censoring scheme. 
However, for the m t =  1 case, we can com pare the tw o bit 
extraction schemes and evaluate their relative benefits.
We begin by form ulating the probability of bit disagree­
m ent in the censoring scheme. The bit is censored w henever 
either a or b m easures a value betw een —7 and  7 . Agreement 
occurs w henever both ya(i) <  —7 and yt,(i) < —7 , or w hen­
ever both  ya(i) > 7 and  yt,(i) > 7 . These cases are show n in 
Fig. 4, w hich is analogous to Fig. 2 for the 1-bit M AQ scheme.
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Fig. 5. Analytical probability of a bit being censored in the censoring 
scheme versus p and 7 .
A ssum ing a joint Gaussian distribution for (yu,yi,), as 
assum ed in Section 6.5, we can calculate the probability of 
censoring, P[Ccns], and  the probability of bit disagreement.
This expression is only a function of 7 / 0-, and  p, and  is 
plotted in Fig. 5. Similarly, the probability of bit disagree­
m ent for the censoring scheme (given that it is not censored) 
is given by
The performance of the censoring scheme should be judged 
on the probability of bit disagreem ent given that the bit is 
used in the secret (is not censored). This is w hy the 
conditional probability of bit disagreem ent is divided by the 
factor of (1 — P[Ccns]). The result is plotted in  Fig. 6.
6.7 Performance Discussion and Comparison
We can com pare the results in Fig. 6 to the m  =  1 line in 
Fig. 3. For low thresholds 7, the censoring scheme results in 
a higher probability of bit disagreem ent than the 1-bit MAQ 
scheme. A t high 7 (e.g., the 7 jcr =  0.2 case) censoring can 
provide a lower bit disagreem ent probability than 1 -bit 
MAQ. However, at high 7, m any bits are censored. For 
example, for 7 jcr =  0.2 and  p =  0.96, the censoring scheme 
achieves conditional probability of bit disagreem ent of 0.01 
com pared to 0.03 for the 1-bit MAQ scheme, bu t the 
censoring scheme m ust censor 24.7 percent of components.
For a m om ent, ignoring the loss of bits caused by the 
censoring scheme, we consider w hen to use the censoring 
scheme instead of the MAQ scheme. W hen the correlation
Fig. 6. Analytical probability of bit disagreement from (19) versus p and 
censoring threshold 7 , given that the bit is not censored.
coefficient p is low, the threshold can be set high, and  the 
conditional probability of bit disagreem ent can be m ade 
lower in the censoring scheme. For example, if one wishes 
to design for highest possible bit rate with Pnn < 0.04, one 
w ould choose m  =  I for 0.95 < p < 0.98, m  =  2 for 0.98 < 
p < 0.993, and  rn =  3 for 0.993 < p < 0.998. For the rn =  I 
case, the censoring scheme could be used in order to lower 
the probability of bit disagreem ent a t the expense of higher 
probability of censoring. In this example, if we have 
com ponents i with pt >  0.98, the MAQ scheme offers more 
bits per m easurem ent component.
7 Experim ental  Im plem entation
In this section, we present the collection of a set of testbed 
RSS m easurem ents on a bidirectional link and  use the data 
to provide an  example of the im plem entation and perfor­
mance of the HRUBE m ethod.
7.1 Setup
We use Crossbow TelosB w ireless sensors which are 
connected via a USB connection to a laptop in order to 
record the collected data for postprocessing and analysis. 
The TelosB mote is a low pow er w ireless sensor m odule 
equipped with an  IEEE 812.15.4-compliant RF transceiver 
(the TI CC2420), built-in antenna and a microcontroller. In 
general, wireless sensors are designed for low data rate and 
low com putation and m emory capabilities, and  the TelosB 
can send 250 kbps. We choose the hardw are to show the 
ability of sim ple hardw are devices to collect channel data 
useful for secret key exchange.
We program  the TelosB 802.15.4 radios to transm it and 
receive packets which are used as channel probes. In 
general, any data could be sent in the probe packets, 
including application data. In our im plem entation, the 
packets include only minimal data: the packet header, a 
node id, and a sequence num ber. W hen one radio receives a 
packet, it m easures and  records the RSS and  stores it with 
the packet sequence num ber. Then, it increm ents the 
sequence num ber and  replies w ith a packet with the 
increm ented sequence num ber. This process repeats until 
the tw o nodes have collected enough probe data. Each 
packet contains a total of 10 bytes and  thus has a duration of 
40 /is. Processing time dom inates the packet duration, and 
the channel is m easured a t a rate of approxim ately 100 probe 
packets per second, or 50 probes per node.
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Fig. 7. Raw measured RSS values from u. to b (+), from 6 to a (o), and 
from I to e (*■).
In any im plem entation, the RSS value m easured by a 
receiver is device specific. O n the TelosB, the RSS is a signed 
8-bit integer value, a value proportional to the m easured 
average received pow er over the duration of the packet, in 
decibel m illiwatts (dBm). While this integer value could be 
converted to a dBm value, it is unnecessary for our 
purposes, since all testbed radios are TelosB devices and 
thus have the same RSSI characteristic.
O ur experim ental tests involve tw o nodes, a and b, about 
0.5 m eters apart, m easuring link («, b). The original channel 
m easurem ent vectors w„ and w () are the lists of m easured 
RSS values a t nodes a and b, respectively. Fig. 7 shows an 
exam ple of w„ and w () m easured over the course of 
100 channel probes. It show s some differences betw een 
the tw o directional m easurem ents, b u t the large-scale 
changes of the tw o signals over time are rem arkably 
similar. The tests also include the m easurem ent at an 
eavesdropper node e w hich receives bu t never transmits. 
Node e is located about 1.5 m  from node b and can m easure 
the RSS on the channels (a,e) and (b,e). Fig. 7 also shows 
the m easurem ent of RSS on link (a ,e). The signal at the 
eavesdropper is qualitatively very different from the true 
link m easurem ents.
Motion of one of the nodes is used to generate fading 
changes in the RSS m easurem ents, w hich is critical to 
observing fading during short-term  experim ents in indoor 
environm ents. During the experim ent, the experim enter 
continuously m oves one of the nodes in a "random " m anner, 
above, below , and  around  its starting  position. Three 
experim ents are conducted, each for a duration of about 
1,000 seconds. In this paper, we chose to m easure vectors 
w ith length N  =  50. Since m easurem ents are taken approxi­
m ately 50 per second, each vector takes 1 second to record. 
The long duration  of the experim ent ensures that we have 
enough data to characterize m ean and  covariance statistics.
7.2 Interpolation
O ur m easurem ent protocol lacks explicit time synchroni­
zation, bu t the protocol approxim ately achieves a frac­
tional time offset of 1/2 at all times. The protocol is 
synchronized in the sense that each node transm its a 
packet as soon as it finishes receiving a probe packet from 
the o ther node. The delay  b e tw een  recep tion  and 
transm ission is nearly the same at each node because 
they have the same hardw are and run  the same software.
Fig. 8. Variances of and correlation coefficients p-, of first 20 components 
of y.
Packets can be delayed or dropped due to interference 
(nodes operate in the same band  as WiFi), bu t we ignore 
these effects. We assum e that T!'-1 is approxim ately 
equal to 1 /2 . That is, node b's probes are sent halfw ay in 
betw een the previous and subsequent node a probes. This 
leads to /i =  0.25 in (2). O ur m easured values w„ and w () 
are run  through the interpolation procedure described in 
Section 4 and  the synchronized data x„ and x*, are then 
form ed using (4).
7.3 Data Model
We use the m easured data from the first experim ent (of three) 
to estim ate the m ean vectors /iXu and  and covariance 
matrix R x of the data vectors, w hich is estim ated as
Rx
/'v. r - Y .i—1 i—1
1




■ IM,) (: ■ IM,
where xj.‘* is the ith  50-length m easured RSS vector at 
node c, and W  = 49,951 is the total num ber of RSS vectors 
which can be form ed from the m easured data at each node.
N ext, w e also calculate the covariance b e tw een  a 











From R x, we calculate the SVD as given in (5). We plot the 
eigenvalues of each eigenvector (the variance of each 
component) in the top subplot of Fig. 8. Then, using the 
KLT m atrix U, we calculate the cross-directional covariance 
matrix from (7) and use it to calculate the correlation 
coefficients pt as given in (8). These correlation coefficients 
are plotted in the bottom  subplot of Fig. 8. The highest
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TABLE 3
Three System Designs: Analytical Gaussian Pm  
and Actual Bit Disagreement Rates
Fig. 9. First nine eigenvectors in the (a) temporal and (b) frequency 
domains. Frequency domain shows real (black square) and imaginary 
(gray triangle) components.
correlation coefficient is 0.9965; there are seven com ponents 
w ith p >  0.98 and 14 com ponents w ith p >  0.95.
Fig. 9 shows the first nine eigenvectors of R x, the columns 
of U, both in the time dom ain and in the frequency domain. 
The results show that the eigenvectors are nearly pure 
sinusoids. For short periods of time (our m easurem ent 
vectors are recorded w ithin one second), we can consider the 
fading signal to be a w ide-sense stationary (WSS) random  
process, and as such, its eigenvectors should be complex 
exponentials. For longer periods of time, m otion m ay not be 
WSS because of changes in the nature of the m otion in the 
channel or of the nodes themselves. Future w ork should 
address the stationarity of the fading process during  secret
generation. Future im plem entations m ay also w ish to use an 
FFT of the m easured RSS values rather than the KLT in order 
to reduce com putational and  m em ory complexity.
Next, we apply  the data model to experim ental data sets 
tw o and three. We transform  the m easured data vectors x (. 
from these latter tw o data sets using the KLT to com pute 
the values of y,. =  U 1 (x — /i,.), for c t  {a, b}. Since we have 
recorded m any seconds of RSS values in the tw o experi­
ments, we have several realizations of y„ and y,, at nodes a 
and  b, respectively. For example, Fig. 10 shows the values of 
the  second com ponent a t nodes a an d  b for d irect 
comparison. Ft is clear that the tw o directional m easure­
m ents are very similar to each other in com parison w ith  the 
changes from  realization to realization.
7.5 MAQ Implementation
Next, we perform  m ultibit adaptive quantization on the 
m easurem ents y„ and  y,,. Fn this im plem entation, node a is 
used as the leader, and  node b is the follower. We design 
three systems for different desired bit disagreem ent rates. 
For example, in the first system, w e design for a F ed =  0.04. 
We are lim ited in the num ber of bits per com ponent by the 
com ponent's correlation coefficient. The correlation coeffi­
cients of the first dozen com ponents are listed in the first 
colum n of Table 4. Using Fig. 3, for each pt, we look up the 
m axim um  num ber of bits in, w hich achieves Pbd < 0.04 (or 
other system  design specification). These are the values of 
in, listed in a colum n of Table 4. We attem pt three different 
system designs: P bd =  0.040, 0.010, and 0.001, for system 
designs 1, 2, and  3, respectively. These specifications are 
listed in Table 3, along w ith  the total num ber of bits 
generated from all com ponents for each system  design. 
Since in; m ust be an integer and  is chosen conservatively 
(P b d  < 0.04 for all i for system design 1), w e w ould expect a 
lower actual bit disagreem ent probability than the design.
Note that a MAQ im plem entation needs to assum e the 
m arginal distributions in order to calculate the thresholds //,. 
We assum e, again, that yu(i) and yi,(i) are zero m ean and 
jointly Gaussian. However, rather than exchange m easured
TABLE 4
Three System Designs: Bits by Component
Fig. 10. Series of ya{2) and m,(2) for 23 subsequent measured vectors 
which show the level of agreement between bidirectional measurements.
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marginal variances via radio communication, which might 
give away to an eavesdropper some information about the 
spread of measured values, we calculate locally the 
variance of at each node from its own collection of measured 
y values. For example, at node a, we use the collected 
realizations of ya{i) through the course of the experiment to 
compute the variance of ya(i) for use at node a. Future 
implementation work will need to study the trade-off 
between latency and other methods for estimating the 
variances of each component.
7.6 Experimental Performance
Finally, we run each system through the data collected 
experimentally. The experimental bit disagreement rate is 
computed by counting the number of bits for which nodes a 
and b disagree and dividing by the total number of bits 
generated in the course of the experiments. Table 3 shows 
the results. In each system design, the actual bit disagree­
ment rate is lower than the Pbd for which the system was 
designed. Since m t is chosen conservatively, as described in 
Section 7.5, we expect the design specification to be an 
upper bound on PBD.
The system designs also show that a large number of bits 
can be extracted from the channel measurements. At the 
highest P b d , we can extract 22 bits per second. This 
compares well to [16] which describes an implementation 
which achieves approximately one bit per second.
Note that the secret key generation rates from the 
HRUBE method, including the 22 bits/sec system, are not 
reconciled; at a bit disagreement rate of 2.2 percent, on 
average, one out of the 22 bits will disagree about 40 percent 
of the time. Other research has used information reconcilia­
tion procedures to reveal small amounts of information 
between two nodes that permitted correction of limited 
numbers of bit disagreements, as discussed in Section 2. We 
assume that such reconciliation will be implemented as part 
of a secret key generation system which reliably finds keys 
which agree at the two ends of a link.
7.7 Statistical Tests of Correlation
We have designed the HRUBE method so that, any pair of bits 
within secret key vector z has zero correlation. In this section, 
we use our large set of measured data to estimate the 
correlation coefficient between bits and test for nonzero 
correlation. We estimate two types of correlation coefficients:
1. Pairwise bit correlation coefficients. We denote pZifij as 
the correlation coefficient between the ith and 
jth  component of vector z, for i /  j.
2. Global bit correlation coefficient. We denote pz as the 
correlation coefficient between all pairs of different 
components of z. A single correlation coefficient is 
only valid if the correlation between any pair of bits 
in z is assumed to be identical.
From the measured data, we generate n =  833 realiza­
tions of the vector z from our data, from which estimated 
pairwise bit correlation coefficients range from
—0.10 to +0.12. The estimated global bit correlation 
coefficient pz is —0.0036.
Clearly, the estimated correlation coefficients will never 
be precisely zero, even if p =  0 exactly. So, for the given 
number of realizations, we provide hypothesis tests to
quantify if these nonzero correlation coefficient estimates 
are likely, or unlikely, to have been generated if the true 
p =  0. Formally, the decision is
H 0 : p  = 0,
H i  : p +  0.
The hypothesis test is performed on statistic t [26],
(22)
t =  p 1 -p *
2____  >
* - n h
where p is the correlation coefficient estimated from the 
data and n is the number of realizations used in the 
estimate, and 7  is a threshold, set based on the desired 
probability of false alarm. The statistic t has the Student-t 
distribution with n — 2 degrees of freedom. Furthermore, in 
the limit for high n, the distribution of t approaches the 
zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian distribution. In practice,
11 >  100 is high enough for this approximation to hold.
For the pairwise bit correlation coefficients, the estimated 
i-statistics for each pair are group tested; that is, the 
threshold 7  is set so that the total probability of false alarm 
is 5 percent. For the given parameters, 7  =  3.70. For the 
three systems in Table 3, all of the correlation coefficients 
p£.j£, have t <  7 . The global bit correlation coefficient, pz, has 
t =  1.74, below the threshold 7  =  1.96 chosen for false alarm 
rate 5 percent.
We also estimate the entropy of the bit sequence output 
from the HRUBE system, using the NIST random generator 
test suite [27], For systems 1, 2, and 3 (shown in Table 3), the 
experimental entropies are estimated to be 0.959, 0.981, and 
0.981, respectively, per generated bit.
7.7.1 Discussion
Both tests indicate that the correlation coefficient between 
bits in z is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
The best estimate of pz is —0.0036. We have similarly run 
tests on other sets of collected data; some data sets pass the 
correlation test and decide Hq, those that decide Hi cross 
the threshold 7  only by a small margin. It is fair to say that 
there may exist small correlations, perhaps |p| < 0.0 1, but 
when given a high number of realizations n, a test may 
detect these small correlations.
Nonzero correlations can be caused by imperfect 
knowledge of the covariance matrix of the interpolated 
RSS sample vector x. Small changes in the covariance 
structure over time may occur, and when this occurs, the 
KLT based on a static transformation matrix U in (6) does 
not produce a completely uncorrelated sample vector 
output. Future work should develop methods to adap­
tively update the KLT from recently measured data to 
further reduce correlations in bit outputs.
Note that subsequent bit vectors z are not designed for 
zero correlation with each other. The HRUBE decorrelates a 
set of N  RSS samples and then produces a bit vector z. A later 
set of N  RSS samples produces another bit vector z' which 
may be correlated with the first vector z. A system designer 
should either 1) set N  high enough such that enough bits can 
be obtained from one bit vector z, or 2) allow time to pass 
between the first and second set of RSS samples such that the
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two sets of samples are uncorrelated. This is a trade-off 
between latency, computational complexity, and correlation, 
which must be studied prior to system deployment.
8 C onclusion
This paper provides a general framework, which we call 
HRUBE, for the extraction of secret uncorrelated bit vectors 
from a series of radio channel measurements. The frame­
work includes interpolation, decorrelation transformation of 
the data, and then an adaptive quantization scheme to allow 
each component to be quantized to an arbitrary number of 
bits. Analysis has been developed to calculate the prob­
ability of bit disagreement using the HRUBE scheme, which 
is used to design systems with a given bound on probability 
of bit disagreement. Numerical results are reported for the 
case of bivariate Gaussian measurements. We show, via an 
implementation of HRUBE, some examples of the bit rate 
versus Pbd trade-off, including the possibility of achieving 
22 bits per second at a bit disagreement rate of 2.2 percent, 
or achieving 10 bits per second at a bit disagreement rate of 
0.54 percent. Experimentally, pairs of bits within one bit 
vector show a correlation coefficient of —0.0036, close to 
perfect decorrelation.
Future work must apply the HRUBE method to other 
modes of radio channel measurements and improve the 
distributional assumptions. In particular, the joint distribu­
tion of ya(i) and yb(i) should be thoroughly investigated 
using large sets of measured data. Many of the system 
design choices (distribution parameters, number of bits per 
component) might be trained in real time from initial 
measurements, and research should investigate such 
methods. For example, quantization levels {i)k} could be 
determined by each node on its own from measured 
vectors y; or nodes could periodically (perhaps once per 
secret) communicate to set them. Research should also 
investigate adaptive update of the KLT in order to achieve 
even lower correlation between bits. Of course, additional 
research should be performed from an attacker's perspec­
tive: to attempt to “break" secret keys generated from 
extraction methods which are seen as weak or to deny the 
ability of two radios to agree on a secret key. Research must 
design key generation systems to be as robust as possible to 
such attacks. The general problem of bit extraction for secret 
key generation, i.e., translating radio channel measurements 
into shared secret key bits, is generally an open statistical 
signal processing problem, and one that may have direct 
impact for the improvement of wireless network security.
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